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Ecologists frequently note the importance of modelling entire ecosystems rather than single 
species, but most bioeconomic models in the current literature focus on a single species. 
While the mathematical difficulty of multiple species may quickly become overwhelming, 
sometimes making the single species option necessary, it is important to recognise the 
significance of the single species assumption to the model results. In this paper, the authors 
address the economic significance of this assumption through the development of a multiple 
species model and demonstrate the importance of interrelationships and economic values to 
the survival of endangered species. 1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Conservation efforts have traditionally been focussed on the identification and preservation of 
a small number of charismatic species. This approach has increasingly been challenged as our 
knowledge of the many and varied interactions among species, their habitat, and the 
environment have improved. While the ecological implications of modelling species in 
isolation rather than as part of an ecosystem, are well documented (Pimm, 1991; Begon et al., 
1996; Milner-Guilland and Mace, 1998), little attention has been paid to the economic 
implications. This paper seeks to redress this imbalance by exploring the introduction of 
multiple species into the traditional bioeconomic modelling framework.  
The bioeconomic modelling of species extinction has grown out of the literature of fisheries 
economics. Working from Gordon’s (1954) seminal fisheries model, Clark (1973) develops a 
model to analyse the decision-making of a sole owner seeking to maximise the present value 
of his harvests. He identifies the conditions under which the owner has an economic incentive 
to harvest the species to extinction. Clark identifies three conditions that would make such a 
choice optimal
1: 1) open access to the resource, 2) a price to harvest cost ratio greater than 
one, and 3) a low growth rate of the resource relative to the social discount rate. If either the 
first condition or the last two conditions are met, then resource extinction may occur. 
Many extensions have been made to Clark’s original model. Clark et al. (1979) study the 
effects of irreversible capital investment, concluding a short-run situation exists during which 
a fishery faces an overcapacity of harvesting resources, before leading to a long-run 
equilibrium situation of optimum sustainable yield.  Swanson (1994) recognising that, unlike 
marine species, terrestrial species compete with humans for the use of land resources, seeks to 
bring the literature ‘onshore’ by including land resources as an additional control variable.  
Further, such models are increasingly applied to issues of terrestrial conservation.  For 
example, Bulte and van Kooten (1996) offer a model of the African Elephant to analyse the 
effects of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) trade ban on 
optimal elephant stocks for the range state of Kenya. The authors present an empirical model 
with terms for harvest revenue, tourism revenue and elephant damage to crops and wildlife 
habitat. 
They conclude, as long as the societal discount rate is greater than 3.5 percent (highly likely 
in the case of a developing nation), a trade ban would result in higher elephant stocks than 
                                                      
1 Clark is careful to note the distinction between socially optimal, and optimal in terms of present value 
maximisation to the resource harvester. It is the latter case Clark considers here. 2 
would be likely under a controlled harvest policy. However, their model generates an optimal 
stock level, irrespective of the discount rate, of 15,700, three hundred less than actual stock at 
the time of the study. Given the perceived need to devote resources to elephant conservation, 
and the declining populations in Kenya, this result is somewhat surprising.  One must 
carefully consider exactly what optimal means in such a case. 
Considering both the harvest and non-harvest case, Skonhoft (1999) analyses the optimal 
management of species when land use costs, non-consumptive benefits and nuisance costs are 
taken into account. Skonhoft concludes, in each case, that an increase in the profitability of 
alternative land use activities (such as farming) will lead to a long-run loss of habitat and 
consequently animal numbers.   
A notable feature of the aforementioned models is their single species focus. Though many 
authors acknowledge the shortcomings of such an approach (Ragozin and Brown, 1985; Bulte 
and van Kooten, 1996) the bioeconomic literature remains dominated by single species 
models. The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast single versus multiple species 
bioeconomic models, paying particular attention to the economic implications arising from 
the misapplication of the single-species case.  
The Clark model is briefly reviewed in Section 2 as a base from which to launch the 
development of our model. The economic theory underlying the multiple species approach is 
examined in Section 3 with reference to the theory of joint production. The multi-species 
model is developed in Section 4 and applied to three cases of species interaction: independent, 
predator-prey and interspecific competition. Finally, some implications of the multiple 
species approach are drawn in Section 5 and suggestions are made for further research. 
2. THE SINGLE SPECIES MODEL 
Although the bioeconomic literature had recognised the possibility of harvesting a species to 
extinction (Smith, 1969; Bachmura, 1971; Gould, 1972), Clark was first to explicitly model 
such a case and it is his work that has formed the foundation of the subsequent literature.  
In a situation in which the owner is seeking to maximise static rent (net revenue) from the 
resource, Clark determines that in all cases, irrespective of the relative price to the cost of 
harvest, an optimal positive stock level results. That is, static rent maximisation never leads to 
extinction. However, when the problem becomes one of maximising the present value of net 
revenue streams, Clark demonstrates that if the price exceeds the cost of harvest for all stock 
levels, and the discount rate is sufficiently large, then the potential for extinction exists.  3 
Clark (1973) posits a societal objective function of maximising the present value of the net 
returns from the resource as follows
2: 
0 max [ ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )]
t
h ep h t h tc x t h t d t
δ ∞ − − ∫      (1) 
..  ( () ) () stx F x th t =− !  
where x(t) is the stock level of the species in time t, h(t) is the harvest of the species in time t, 
p(h(t)) is the inverse demand curve defined as a function of harvest, c(x(t)) is the unit cost of 
harvest as a function of stock, and δ  is the societal discount rate. For convenience of 
exposition, the time notation will subsequently be suppressed, but will be understood to be 
implicit in all control and state variables. 
Clark applies this problem to an optimal control framework, then derives and manipulates the 
necessary conditions to arrive at the condition associated with optimal stock levels (x*) as 
shown in Equation (2).  
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Equation (2) represents a modified version of the golden rule equation common in natural 
resource applications. The original golden rule,  () F x δ ′ = , suggests the resource should be 
maintained at a stock level such that the returns to capital available to the resource owner, δ , 
are equal to the marginal productivity of the renewable resource stock,  () F x ′ . 
In this modified form, Equation (2) implies that returns to the resource are dependent upon 
two factors: the growth rate of the resource and the cost of harvest (which is a decreasing 
function of stock, () 0 cx ′ < ). This modification therefore increases the effective marginal 
productivity of the stock relative to the discount rate, making the stock a more attractive 
investment.  
The policy implications are straightforward. Extinction results from low growth rates and 
high price–cost (of harvest) ratios. Given that policymaker’s ability to alter the growth rate of 
a natural resource is limited, the policy response must focus on the price-cost ratio. As 
Swanson (1994) points out, this is the mechanism by which policies such as a CITES trade 
ban works. By effectively removing the value of harvest, policymakers create a more 
favourable price–cost ratio for the species in question. 
                                                      
2 For notational consistency with the models below, we use Clark’s (1976) interpretation of Clark (1973).  4 
3. DEALING WITH MULTIPLE SPECIES 
The model given above presents an unspecified growth function of the renewable resource 
stock,  () F x . This is often assumed to be the logistic growth function first proposed as a 







 (3)   
where  r is the intrinsic growth rate of the resource and K is the carrying capacity of the 
habitat.  This growth function in the fishery problem is analogous to the production function 
in general economic theory. 
Production economics literature makes clear the distinction between firms producing single 
outputs and those producing multiple outputs (Beattie and Taylor, 1985). The function 
specified above clearly belongs to the former case. However, to the extent that the allocation 
of land resources for conservation of one species necessarily provides habitat to other species 
which share that land, conservation management may be more properly viewed as a multiple 
product production process. To recognise this relationship within the bioeconomic framework 
it is necessary to specify multiple product production functions. 
Within multiple product production, distinction is drawn between joint and non-joint 
production. Joint production is said to exist when more than one output emerges from a single 
productive activity. Two classes of joint production are distinguished in the literature: the 
case where all joint products are desirable, and the case where one product is desirable while 
another is undesirable (Baumgartner et al, 2001). The latter case is well documented in the 
ecological economics literature. Early authors, including Johann Heinrich von Thumen, 
William Jevons and Karl Marx, all address the phenomenon of pollutants arising as joint 
products of desired goods (Baumgartner, 2000).  
While well studied in production economics, the case where all joint products are desirable 
has received little attention in ecological economics. However, Baumgartner et al (2001) have 
recently suggested joint production, though not recognised as such, is in fact a fundamental 
concept in ecology. They argue that ecosystems “…as open, self-organising systems, 
necessarily take in several inputs and generate several outputs…” (p.367).  Although it is by 
no means the case that all species are at all times desirable, it is a working assumption in this 
article that the conservation problem is one in which that assumption may hold.  Thus, we 
will not address the case of undesirable species in this work. 5 
A further distinction found in the literature is between allocable and non-allocable factors of 
production. Allocable factors are those for which the amount of the factor of production used 
in producing a given output y1 can be distinguished from the amount of that factor used in 
producing output y2 (Beattie and Taylor, 1985).  
 
Where the factor under consideration is conservation land, clearly we have a case of a non-
allocable factor. Once a conservation area has been established, the area is freely available for 
use by each species living within it. The case of joint production with non-allocable factors of 
production is illustrated in Figure 1, 
 
Figure 1.   A non-allocable factor of production.  (Adapted from: Beattie and 
Taylor, 1985) 
  
where X represents the total quantity of input (land), and F1(⋅ ) and F2(⋅ ) represent the 
production functions through which X is converted into outputs y1 and y2 (species 1 and 2) 
respectively. 
4. THE MULTIPLE SPECIES MODEL 
a. The Generalised Model 
In this section, we develop a simple two-species model to demonstrate the effect of adding 
additional species to the single species bioeconomic framework. Suppose society wishes to 
maximise the present value of net returns from harvesting both species. The objective 
function may be specified as: 
11 1 1 2 2 22 0 max {[ ( )] [ ( )] }
t
L
h ep c x h p c x hp L
δ δ
∞ − −+ − − ∫  (4) 
where subscripts denote species one and two, L is a unit of terrestrial resource (land) upon 
which the species depends for survival, and pL is the unit price of a base unit of that land 
resource. Following Swanson (1994), this land term is multiplied by the social discount rate, 











alternative returns available from use of the same land.  For transparency the inverse demand 
function of the standard bioeconomic model, p(h), has been replaced by fixed prices p1 and p2. 
All other notation is as previously indicated. 
The dynamics defining the change in stock of each species are represented by the state 
equations: 
11 21 (, ,) x Fxx L h =− !  (5) 
21 2 2 (, ,) x Gx x L h =− !  (6) 
where  () 12 ,, F xxLand  () 12 ,, GxxLare the joint production functions of species one and 
two, where the land resource, L, is non-allocable.  
Using the Pontryagin necessary conditions for maximisation of this problem, and simplifying 
the notation by allowing  11 1 1 1 1 () () R Rx p cx == −  and  22 2 2 2 2 () () R Rx p cx == − to 




























=− +  (9) 
We assume throughout that  12 ,0 RR>  for all relevant levels of  12 , x x , otherwise the cost of 
harvest would exceed the revenues and no harvest would occur. Equation (7) reflects the 
impact of the land control term in the objective function, and is a multiple species version of 
the result found by Swanson (1994). This condition implies that society will allocate land 
only to the extent that the species supported by it are able to generate a competitive rate of 
return from their use of the resource.  In a single species model, it would appear that this 
return must be generated entirely by the species under consideration.  However, when the 
conservation of a wilderness area provides benefits to many species, the returns generated by 
all species may contribute to meeting the required returns from the land resource.   
Although we restrict our intention to the two species case, the extension to multiple species 
will simply lead to additional terms on the RHS, resulting in a further reduction of individual 
                                                      
3 For the full derivation of these conditions, see the Appendix. 7 
species burden. This relationship holds regardless of the nature of any interdependence 
between the species.  
Equations (8) and (9) are modified golden rule equations for species 1 and 2 respectively, 
analogous to that shown in Equation (2). Recall that the LHS and the first term on the RHS 
indicate that the resource must be maintained at a stock level such that the marginal 
productivities of the resource stocks, F1 and G2, equate to the return available from other 
assets δ . All other terms on the RHS modify that relationship. 
The second terms on the RHS of Equations (8) and (9) reflect the stock-dependent harvest 
costs ( () 0 cx ′ < ), expressed proportionately to the unit net revenue of harvesting the 
resource. The only adjustment from the single species case is that the growth functions, 
() 12 ,, F xxL and  () 12 ,, GxxL, are now potentially interdependent. As before, this term acts 
to increase the marginal productivity of the resource, making the resource a more attractive 
investment.  While these terms exhibit potential interdependence between species, they arise 
directly from the harvest activity and are strongly dependent on the ratio of marginal costs to 
marginal revenues. 
The third terms on the RHS of Equations (8) and (9) reflect the biological interdependence of 
the two species, modified by the relative marginal profitability of each.  Each equation 
indicates that returns for one species are modified by the marginal affect that species has on 
the other, times the proportional revenue of the other species to the first.  Whether this makes 
a species more or less desirable in the human asset portfolio depends upon both the ecological 
relationship between the species and the relative values of the species.  We shall henceforth 
refer to these as the interdependence terms. 
b. Considering Species Interdependence 
We consider three cases of species interdependence: (i) independent species, (ii) a predator-
prey relationship, and (iii) species competition. 
(i) Independent Species  
In the independent case, each species’ state equation is a function only of its own population 
and the land resource so that  112 212 (, ,) (, ,) 0 GxxL FxxL == . Equations (5) and (6) become: 
111 (,) x FxL h =− !  (10) 
222 (,) x Gx L h =− ! . (11) 8 
Consequently, the interdependence terms of Equations (8) and (9) become zero, and the 



















=−  (13) 
In the independent species case, harvest decisions for each species are made without regard to 
the existence of the other species. In this respect, a two species model would yield the same 
results as two independently developed single species models is we failed to consider the 
constraint on returns to land.  In a fisheries case, in which there were no returns to land to 
consider, species independence may be sufficient to justify the use of a single species model.  
However, for terrestrial conservation, each species is still dependent on the same land input 
for its production as indicated in Equation (7).  Thus, both species still contribute to returns to 
the land resource even though each species may be harvested as indicated in a single species 
model. Swanson (1994) makes a compelling argument for considering returns to land in 
terrestrial species conservation. This model supports that argument and extends it by 
demonstrating the need to consider all relevant species in an ecosystem, even when they 
appear to be independent. 
(ii) Predator-Prey  
The predator-prey relationship is defined as one in which the growth of one species is 
positively affected by the presence of the second, but in which the growth of the second 
species is adversely affected by the presence of the first.  In the generalised model, this 
implies  ()() 112 212 ,, 0 , ,, 0 GxxL FxxL <>  or  ()() 112 212 ,, 0 , ,, 0 GxxL FxxL >< . 
Suppose species 1 is a predator ( () 112 ,, 0 GxxL < ) and species 2 is its prey 
( () 21 2 ,, 0 FxxL > ). Then the interdependence term of Equation (8), works against the 
predator (makes it less valuable), while the corresponding term in Equation (9), works in 
favour of the prey species.   If both species have a harvest value, the predator, by reducing the 
growth of its prey, is reducing the potential returns to the land resource. Conversely, the prey 
is increasing potential returns by increasing the growth of the predator. The magnitudes of 
these impacts are dependent on the relative value of the two species. We offer two cases: (a) 9 
the predator is of greater value than the prey and (b) the prey is of greater value than the 
predator. 
(a) Predator has greater value (R1>R2). 
As the value of the predator increases relative to that of the prey, the magnitude of the term 
working against the predator in Equation (8) is reduced, while the magnitude of the term 
working in favour of the prey in Equation (9) is increased. This creates a situation in which 
the relative values are working in favour of both species. At moderate ratios of net revenue, 
the resource owner has the incentive to maintain healthy positive populations of both species; 
the predator as a source of harvest revenue, and the prey as both a source of food for the 
predator and for harvest. 
In the extreme case, as the net value of the prey approaches zero, Equation (8) reverts to 
something similar to the single-species modified golden rule condition and Equation (9) 
approaches the (unmodified) golden rule result. Interdependencies remain in these equations, 
however, as the predator is still dependent on the prey for food.  The model predicts the 
relationship we would expect where a high-value predator is harvested and a low-value prey 
is not, in that significant populations of both stocks are maintained. 
(b) Prey has greater value (R1<R2). 
When the prey is of greater relative value, the magnitude of the term working against the 
predator in Equation (8) is increased, while simultaneously decreasing the magnitude of the 
term working in favour of the prey in Equation (9) (as the value of the prey as a food source 
for the predator is reduced). At modest ratios of net revenue, the owner has incentives to 
maintain both species, but at smaller equilibrium populations than when the predator has the 
greater value. 
As the harvest value of the predator approaches zero ( 1 0 R → ), given the prey has some 
positive net value ( 2 0 R > ), then the resource owner has the incentive to harvest the predator 
to extinction.  This is the behaviour exhibited by livestock owners around the world as they 
seek to eliminate all predation of their stock, and is a principle cause of the decline of wild 
predators. 10 
(iii) Competition  
The distinguishing characteristic of this case is that each species acts against the interests of 
the other, so that  ()() 112 212 ,, 0 , ,, 0 GxxL FxxL << .  One again, the outcome is determined 
by the relative values of the species. If species 1 is of greater (lesser) value than species 2, 
then the magnitude of the term working against species 1 in Equation (8) is reduced 
(increased), and the magnitude of the term working against the second species in Equation (9) 
is increased (reduced). If competition exists between two species, the resource owner has the 
incentive to reduce populations of the lower value species, in favour of retaining the species 
with higher value. At moderate ratios of net revenue, the resource owner has insufficient 
incentive to exterminate the less valuable species, and populations of both species will be 
retained. 
However, as one species gains significantly greater value than the other, the resource owner 
has an incentive to harvest the less valued species to extinction, so as to devote all of the land 
resources to production of the more valuable species.  Livestock husbandry is the extreme 
manifestation of this behaviour. 
5. CONCLUSION 
While the importance of taking an ecosystem approach to species conservation is well 
documented in the ecological and conservation biology literatures, the economic implications 
have been less thoroughly addressed. Working from within the existing bioeconomic 
framework, we have developed a multiple species model that allows several economic 
implications to be drawn, and in part illustrates the incentives behind observable human 
actions.  
The model demonstrates that the addition of species to the single species framework spreads 
the burden of generating a competitive return to land resources across all species, which 
otherwise may appear to fall solely on an individual species. This may have significant 
quantitative implications for the estimation of optimal species stocks, such as those calculated 
by Bulte and van Kooten (1996) for the African Elephant. It further illustrates that this result 
holds independently of the relationship between the species. 
Where interdependencies between species exist, the model demonstrates more complex 
behavioural relationships. The predator-prey case highlights the importance a species relative 
value has on its ultimate fate. The case in which the prey is of high value and the predator of 
little value is particularly revealing. Here the incentive exists for the resource owner to 
harvest the predator species to extinction. The decline of wild predators throughout the world 11 
can largely be traced to behaviour consistent with that predicted by the model. When the 
predator is of relatively higher value, the incentives act to preserve both species. Though this 
case is less common than the former, it can be observed in many areas of the world, such as in 
African game parks where the presence of predators is critical to the success of the 
operations. 
Relative values also have implications for competing species. In this case each species acts 
against the economic interest of the other and resource owners have the incentive to reduce 
stocks of low value species in favour of retaining species of high value, though this tendency 
is often buffered from extremes by the presence of stock-dependent harvest costs. 
An important outcome of the model is that one can use it to infer the conditions under which a 
single species model may be appropriate, at least in general terms. If species are independent, 
and either the opportunity cost of capital or the value of wilderness land is very low, then a 
single species model may yield results similar to that of a multiple species model. In this case 
the burden on species, as given by Equation (7), is negligible while Equations (8) and (9) 
become similar to the single species modified golden rule.  
Similarly, if the relative value of one species is significantly greater than that of all others in 
the ecosystem, then a single species model may also approximate the results of a multiple 
species approach. In this case, the interdependent terms are negligible for all except the 
species of value.  Even when this occurs, the valid use of a single species model is not certain 
as the ecological interdependencies in the species’ growth functions may still introduce 
additional effects not considered here.  Such effects must be considered on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Clearly, in the absence of these conditions, the model demonstrates that the inclusion of at 
least all economically valuable species in an ecosystem is important. Using single species 
models where multiple species are economically significant may lead to misleading results 
and ultimately to incorrect policy decisions. 12 
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APPENDIX — DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS (7, 8, 9) 
The societal objective function is: 
11 1 1 22 2 2 0
11 2 1
21 2 2
m a x { [ ( () ) ] () [ ( () ) ] () () }
..  ( () , () , () ) ()
      ( () , () , () ) ()
t
L h e pc x th t p c x th t p L t
st x F x t x t Lt h t
xG x t x t L t h t
δ δ







For notational convenience, the time notation will subsequently be omitted, but will be 
understood to be implicit in all control and state variables. 
The current value Hamiltonian is: 
11 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2
21 2
[( ) ] [ ( ) ] ( , , )
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=− − +− − − +
+
 (A1) 
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 Co-state equations 
111 1 1 2 1 1 1
1




λλ λ δ λ
−∂ ′ =−− + + = −
∂
!  (A5) 
222 1 2 2 2 2 2
2




λλ λ δ λ
−∂ ′ =−− + + = −
∂
!  (A6) 
State equations 
12 1 ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ) 0 Fxt x t Lt ht −= (A7) 
12 2 ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ) 0 Gxt x t Lt h t −=  (A8) 
 15 
and the usual transversality and boundary conditions. 
Solve Equations (A2) and (A3) for λ 1 and λ 2 respectively 
11 1 1 () p cx λ =−  (A9) 
22 2 2 () p cx λ =−  (A10) 
Take d/dt of Equations (A9) and (A10) 
11 1 1 () cxx λ ′ =− ! !  (A11) 
2 222 () cxx λ ′ =− ! !  (A12) 
Substitute Equations (A9) and A(10) into A(4) 
[] [ ] 11 1 22 2 () () 0 LL L pp c x Fp c x G δ −+ − +− =  (A13) 
Substitute Equations (A9), (A10) , A(11) and A(12) into Equations (A5) and (A6) 
111 1 11 1 2 22 1 111 1 11 ()- [ () ] [ () ] () [ () ] cxh p cx F p cx G cxx p cx δ ′′ −− − = − − !    (A14) 
222 1 11 2 2 22 2 222 2 22 ()- [ () ] [ () ] () [ () ] cxh p cxF p cx G cxx p cx δ ′′ −− − =− − !  (A15) 
Assume a system in equilibrium such that all conditions are met simultaneously.  Let  0 x = ! at 
equilibrium, by definition, so that  11 1 () 0 cx x ′ −= ! and 22 2 (x ) 0 cx ′ −= ! . Further, let 
11 2 (, ,) hF x x L =  and  21 2 (,,) hG x x L = at equilibrium from Equations (A7) and (A8). Given 
these assumptions, solve Equations (A13), (A14) and (A15) for δ . 
11 1 22 2 [( ) ] [ ( ) ] LL
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Let unit net revenue from species i be denoted  [] () ii i i R pc x =−  and substitute into (A16), 
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